This paper extends the spatial theory of voting to an institutional structure in which policy choices depend upon not only the executive but also the composition of the legislature. Voters have incentives to be strategic since policy reflects the outcome of a simultaneous election of the legislature and the executive and since the legislature's impact on policy depends upon relative plurality. To analyze equilibrium in this game between voters, we apply "coalition proof' type refinements. The model has several testable implications which are consistent with voting behavior in the United States. For instance, the model predicts: (a) split-tickets where some voters vote for one party for president and the other for congress; (b) for some parameter values, a divided government with different parties controlling the executive and the majority of the legislature; and (c) the midterm electoral cycle with the party holding the presidency always losing votes in midterm congressional elections.
INTRODUCTION
NATIONAL POLICIES TYPICALLY REFLECT the composition of both the executive and the legislature. In the United States, for instance, the administration's influence on policy is affected by the composition of congress.
Traditional spatial models of elections ignore this institutional complexity and assume that the winner of a two-party race fully controls policy.2 These models focus on the strategic interaction between the candidates and treat each voter as a passive player, voting for the candidate offering the more preferred policy.
In our model, instead, the voters face two parties with preferences defined on policy outcomes (Wittman (1977 (Wittman ( , 1990 , Calvert (1985) , Alesina (1988) ). Without "checks" by the legislature, the executives representing the two parties pursue distinct and polarized policies.3 However, policy outcomes in our model are a function not only of which party holds the executive but also of the composition of the legislature.
The ideal policies of the two parties are identified by two points on an interval; voters to the left of the left party's policy always vote for this party in both the legislative and presidential elections; similarly, voters on the right of the right party have a dominant strategy to vote for the right party. In contrast, voters with ideal policies intermediate between the positions of the parties take advantage of the institutional structure of "checks and balances" to moderate the executive and achieve a policy outcome closer to their ideal. This realistic feature of the model implies strategic voting. Unlike the traditional spatial model, the decision of each "middle-of-the-road" voter depends upon his beliefs about the behavior of other voters. Thus we examine strategic voting in the context of the "new institutionalism's" concern about the executive-legislative interaction (Shepsle (1986) , Hammond and Miller (1988) , Fiorina (1990 Fiorina ( , 1991 ). 4 Our model of "moderating behavior" has implications consistent with three observations concerning American politics: split-ticket voting, the midterm cycle, and divided government. The model predicts split-ticket voting when the executive and the legislature are elected simultaneously. That is, some voters support different parties in the two elections to, say, counterbalance a president on the right with a legislature on the left. The model also captures the persistent phenomenon of the "midterm voting cycle." In midterm congressional elections, the president's party loses plurality relative to the preceding congressional elections held simultaneously with the presidential election. Our explanation relies upon the fact that in presidential election years the electorate faces uncertainty about who will win the presidency. Moderate voters want neither a left-dominated congress for fear that the president may turn out to be left, nor a right-dominated congress lest the president be right. Their uncertainty about the outcome of the presidential election leads them to prefer a "hedged" congress. At midterm, once the identity of the president is known, voters move congress further in the direction opposite to that of the president in order to achieve better moderation. Empirical studies by Alesina and Rosenthal (1989) , Erikson (1990) , and Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal (1993) have shown that this model of the midterm effect performs at least as well and often better than traditional empirical voting models that emphasize incumbency advantage and retrospective voting based on the state of the economy.5 A sufficiently strong midterm cycle or substantial split-ticket voting will produce divided government where the party holding the presidency does not have a majority in the legislature.
We present both a complete information and an incomplete information model. In the former, but not the latter, the distribution of voter ideal points is common knowledge. Split-ticket voting, moderating behavior, and divided gov4Cox (1987) analyzes strategic voting when voters decide more than one contest in the context of the double-member districts of Victorian England. He finds evidence of substantial split-ticket voting until cabinet government is instituted. With cabinet government, policy depends only on a parliamentary majority and not on, as in the American system, an executive-legislative interaction that is affected by the composition of the legislature. The virtual disappearance of split-ticket voting under cabinet government is expected from the perspective of our model. 5Erikson (1988) tests coattails and other alternative explanations of the midterm cycle and finds that they are not supported by the data. emnment, present in both cases, can be more easily illustrated with the complete information model.6 A midterm cycle emerges only in the incomplete information model. The Alesina and Rosenthal (1995, pp. 43-120) volume, written after the initial draft of this paper, motivates these models using the concept of conditional sincerity briefly discussed in Section 3.2 of this paper but does not analyze equilibrium using the game-theoretic concepts of abstract stable sets and coalition proof Nash equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the one-period model and the game-theoretic solution concepts which we employ. We analyze equilibrium in this basic model in Section 3. This section uses rather general assumptions about functional forms. In Section 4 we present the two-period complete information case with more restrictive assumptions. In Section 5 we discuss the incomplete information version of the model for specific functional forms. Section 6 concludes.
THE ONE-PERIOD MODEL

Preferences and Institutional Setup
We consider a two-party system in which the parties (identified with the candidates) have policy preferences. In particular, the two parties, labelled D and R, and the voters have unidimensional, continuous, and strictly concave utility functions over a single policy issue. Utility functions are all identical except for the bliss point. The utility of a policy x is given as
where, for the two parties, we denote the bliss points as OD and OR with 0 < OD < OR < 1 and, for the generic voter i, we denote the bliss point as Oi. There is a continuum of voters. The bliss point cumulative distribution H(O) is continuous and strictly increasing on the interval I = [0,1]. The median type is denoted ,u = H-1 (0.5). Any non-null subset, S, of I is termed a coalition. The preferences of both parties and voters are common knowledge. We choose to work with a continuum of voters rather than with a finite number for reasons of technical convenience clarified in footnote 13, following Proposition 2 below. The president is elected by majority vote. If the executive had complete control of policy, the party winning the presidency would adopt its ideal policy 6 Fiorina (1988) proposed a model of split-ticket voting which is related to ours; however there are three important differences between the models. Fiorina's specification allows for only four policy outcomes, corresponding to the four combinations of parties holding the executive and the majority in the legislature, while we allow for a continuum of policies. Second, and more importantly, Fiorina does not consider strategic voting. Third, since Fiorina's model has only one period, he does not address the midterm cycle.
(OD or OR).7 However, the institutional structure of our model posits that policy is determined by a compromise between the president and the legislature, which is elected by strict proportional representation in a single national district. where gj( ), j E {D, R}, is continuous, strictly increasing in its argument with g1(O) = 0, and is common knowledge. Equations (2) and (3) capture the idea that policy outcomes are further from the president's ideal policy the greater the opposition's share in the legislature. Since the functions gj( ) can be nonlinear, they can be very "steep" at VR = 2, that is at the point where the majority in the legislature changes hands.8 We assume Condition (5) states that, realistically, for a given level of the legislative vote, policy is always more "left" when D is president than when R is president.
Let us define
We now specify a one-period game in which both the president and the legislature are elected simultaneously. In Section 4 we extend the model to a two-period case in which the president serves for two periods while the legislature is elected every period.
The Game
Each voter i chooses strategy zi specified as a pair z lz7 E Z_ {DD, DR, RD, RR}, where zi refers to the presidential election and Z2 to the legislative. We treat only pure strategies in the text. In the Appendix, we show that this restriction is inconsequential. Let Z' be the Cartesian product of the Zi and Z = Z1Z2 be an element of ZI. Without loss of generality, we limit 7In a two party regime without institutidnal checks and balances, this is the one-shot equilibrium to the electoral game described in Alesina (1988) . In fact, no other policy announced prior to elections would be implemented by the elected party, given that the party can choose its ideal policy when in office. Thus, rational voters would not believe in any announcement other than the party ideal policy. 8 In fact, all our complete information results hold in the discontinuous, majoritarian setup of Fiorina (1988) For any z, the policy outcomes can be determined by substituting VRZ for VR in (2) or (3). Utilities are then determined by (1).
While our analysis allows for all measurable z, it is useful to define "cutpoint" strategies. 
The Need for a Refinement
We must apply a refinement of the Nash concept to our game to address three problems engendered by our model.
The first problem arises from our institutional structure incorporating simultaneous election of the executive and the legislature and proportional representation. In standard two-candidate models, voters are simply assumed to vote for their more preferred candidate. That is, voters are sincere. In game-theoretic terms, the refinement of elimination of weakly dominated strategies solves the multiple equilibria problems associated with the "all or none" feature of a two-candidate election.
In our setup, (5) The second problem arises because there is a continuum of voters. If an individual voter's strategy has no measurable impact on policy, then every strategy is Nash for this voter. Analysis of coalitions of voters is a constructive way to overcome not only this problem but, more importantly, the first problem of the absence of dominant strategies.
The "credibility" of coalitions is the third problem we encounter. This problem is highlighted as we turn to a discussion of the properties we believe should be satisfied by a refinement.
Given the incentive voters with ideal points in (OD, OR) have to "moderate" outcomes, it is intuitive that there can be only two possible equilibrium outcomes. In one, D wins the presidency and R is relatively strong in the legislature while in the other an R president is balanced by D strength in the legislature. Consider the latter case. It is an almost immediate result that in equilibrium there will be a cutpoint. OR The coalition proof Nash (CPN) equilibrium concept of Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987) addresses the problem of credible deviations. CPN in essence restricts which vote-switching deviations are permitted. The basic idea in CPN is that, to be an equilibrium, a strategy constellation z must not only be Nash but not subject to challenge from a credible coalition that intemally deviates to some z'.
Bernheim et al. developed CPN only for the case of a finite number of players. In this case, the concept can be specified recursively. In a single player game, the singleton must be individually rational. For N player games, N > 1, assume CPN has been defined for games with fewer than N players. For the N 11 It will become clear below that this credibility problem applies not only to Oi O 0D, who have a weakly dominant strategy, but also to some Oi > OD player game, z is (a) self-enforcing if, for all coalitions with n players, 1 < n < N, it is a CPN in the game induced on n by holding the strategies of nonmembers to the strategies used in z and (b) CPN if it is both self-enforcing and strictly Pareto undominated by any other self-enforcing strategy.
This definition implies, in somewhat loose terms, that a "proposal" by a two person coalition is "stable" if it is not subject to an individually rational deviation by its members, that a three person coalition must have a proposal that is not subject to either a credible deviation by any two-person coalition or to an individual deviation, etc.
In the context of our previous example, the CPN refinement says that it is not self-enforcing for extreme-left voters to "promise" to vote R in the legislative election to create a coalition with moderate-left voters who would like to elect a D president but only with strong R representation in the legislature. CPN rules out such coalitions which are not credible in the sense of not being selfenforcing.
In order to apply the same idea to a continuum of voters, we use Greenberg's (1989; 1990, Ch. 7) generalization of the "no credible deviation" approach of CPN. We first restate his stability concept, without specific reference to our game.
Let zi be an individual strategy, Zi be i's (nonempty and compact) strategy set, ZA 
2\ A(Z). That is, X is internally stable (for all (S, z) and (T, y) EX, neither (S,z) <(T, y) nor (T, y) <(S, z)) and extemally stable (for every (S, z) X, 3(T,y) E=5X such that (S, z) < (T, y)).
THEOREM (Greenberg (1989) In other words, Greenberg shows a correspondence between abstract stable sets and CPN for a finite number of players. Consequently, we use the abstract stable set, which is also defined for the continuum, as a generalization of the CPN concept. For our model, the abstract stable set has a simple characterization; it is the unique set of pairs that are undominated by members of the abstract core. With a slight abuse of terminology we will indicate the pair(s) (I, z) in this stable set as CPN equilibria for this game. 
Simultaneous Choice of Executive and Legislature
We now analyze the unrestricted game in which voters jointly choose the executive and the legislature. We begin with three definitions. Then we characterize the abstract core. Finally, we show that the abstract stable set (CPN) is the set of pairs that are undominated by members of the abstract core. Given that a "left" coalition must pivot against R president, the next lemma gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for the rightmost member of that coalition to gain utility in deviating. In turn, if the rightmost member gains, all members gain. The position of the legislature is also a weighted average, the weights being the vote shares of the two parties. Using (2'), (3') , and H uniform, we obtain OD + k The basic nature of these observations carries over to the more general gj(-) functions. In particular, with a powerful president, strong legislative opposition is needed for balancing; thus, divided government becomes more likely. The two possible equilibrium outcomes, 0R and 0D' depend only on the gj(C) and H(-). Whether both or just one of these outcomes is CPN also depends on the "shape" of u( where i E {D, RI and h E {E, LI. Thus, the first subscript identifies the party, the second identifies the "executive" or the "legislative" branch of the party. We assume only the following: It can be shown that three basic results obtained in the homogeneous case apply here as well: (i) in the case of u( ) symmetric, whichever Oj is closer to the median is a CPN equilibrium; (ii) the legislative vote for a party is always higher when the party does not control the executive; (iii) for some parameter values "divided government" is possible.
In the homogeneous case, policy outcomes were always in between the ideal policies of the two presidents. When does this result continue to hold; that is, are presidents moderated by the legislature? To address this question we focus, without loss of generality, on the case of D president, the case of R president being symmetric. In the more inteyesting case in which the two parties are on opposite sides of the median, simple algebraic manipulation then shows that, for u( ) symmetric, the president is moderated if any of the following three conditions holds: (i) 0DE < 3 Executives are always moderated if they are further than 6 from the median.
(ii) ODL + ORL = 1. Executives are always moderated if the legislative parties are symmetric about the median.
(iii) 0DL 2 ODE. An executive who is more extreme than his legislative party is always moderated.
When none of these conditions hold, the policy outcome may be more extreme than the president's ideal point. In this case a "moderate" president balances an extreme legislature.
THE TWO PERIOD MODEL
In the two-period model, the setup is identical to the one-period model except that preferences are intertemporally additive with discount factor ,8. In the first period, legislative and presidential elections are held simultaneously; in the second, the executive remains in office and new legislative elections are held. This scenario is intended to capture the structure of elections in the United States.
An 
Conditions (i) and (ii) repeat
Greenberg's definition of dominance. Condition (iii) adds dynamic consistency to Greenberg's specification. For dominance to occur, there must be at least one subgame in which all members of S are better off with z than with z'. In addition, there can be no subgame in which any member of S is worse off. In our game, there are two subgames, one corre-15 It is unnecessary to condition Z3 on the t = 1 vote shares, since the presidential share does not affect utilities and the legislature is entirely reelected in period 2. 16 In this paper, we do not attempt to prove that the abstract stable set for our dominance relation is, parallel to Greenberg (1989) , isomorphic with the perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibria.
sponding to the second period with a D president, the other to R president. Proposition 2, the pivotal voter theorem, gives the unique CPN outcome in each subgame. Note that even if z implies R president, z will be dominated if it does not satisfy a C condition in the second period for D president.
With no uncertainty about preferences, in equilibrium the outcome of the presidential election is known before the first-period elections. Since no information is revealed by the first-period elections, voter behavior does not change in the second period. This implies that the equilibrium cutpoints in the legislative elections in the two periods are identical. PROPOSITION 
THE MODEL WITH UNCERTAINTY: THE MIDTERM CYCLE
The Model with Incomplete Infornation
This section considers the case in which the distribution of voters' preferences is perturbed by a random shock. The presence of this form of uncertainty will cause some voters to alter their legislative votes over the two periods, leading to a midterm cycle.
We assume intertemporally additive, quadratic preferences for both parties and voters: 
Voting in Legislative Elections
We begin by considering the legislative elections at t = 2. The analysis parallels Section 3.1. The vote for the legislature, which now depends on the realization of a, is denoted VR(a). The expected second-period utility of voter i, with a bliss point Oi such that OR < Oi < OD when R is president is given by 18 The varying players interpretation of the models can be motivated by the assumption that electoral participation is predominantly driven by nonvoting from alienation (Hinich and Ordeshook (1969); Rosenthal and Sen (1973)) where nonvoters are disproportionately extremists. But it would fail to take into account nonvoting by indifferent middle-of-the-road voters. The set of voters would not change if we permitted a shock to occur only in the first period. The first-period vote reveals the shock a to the electorate which then plays the second period with complete information. None of our results would change qualitatively with this formalization, but the algebra and the presentation would be somewhat more cumbersome.
In the Appendix, we show that (14) and the assumption of quadratic preferences allow us to express the relevant indirect preferences in terms of expected votes. Let EVR2Zj denote the expected vote at t = 2 when j has won the presidency at t = 1. Let EVR21j denote voter i's indirect bliss point; 0j2 is a legislative cutpoint in period 2 when party j holds the presidency. PROOF: See Appendix.
The analogy with the complete information case is that the expected policy is equal to the ideal policy of the pivotal voter (0R*2 or OD*2).
Let us now turn to the first-period election. Let EVR1 denote i's expected vote bliss point for the legislative elections at t = 1 given the presidential component of z. (Note that the separability of (13) and the assumption that the entire legislature is elected in both periods imply that the t = 1 legislative bliss point depends on presidential voting only and not on expectations concerning the second period.) Let Pz be the ex ante probability that R is president, that is the probability when all voters believe that z will be the strategy but do not know a.19 Note that (or 0(z) = OD*2). Thus, with no uncertainty about the presidential outcome, the legislative cutpoints are the same in both periods; as in the complete information model, we do not have (in expectation) a midterm cycle. In contrast, with uncertain presidential elections, satisfying (C2) implies a midterm congressional cycle: the party of the president always has lower expected plurality in midterm legislative elections than in the legislative elections held at the same time as the presidential elections.
Presidential Voting
Let us now turn to the presidential vote. If 0 < P2 < 1, there is a critical value of a above which party R wins the presidency and obtains a relatively high vote for the legislature. The expected utility of a voter is obtained by integrating out over a, switching from D to R president at the critical value. (See Appendix.) A voter will vote for R for president if and only if his expected utility, E!jR, conditional on R president is greater than his expected utility, EUiD, conditional on D president.20 That is, a sufficient condition for domination is as follows. We now develop an important condition on the presidential strategy components given the legislative vote. The necessary condition for a unique interior intersection, found in the relative slopes of (17) Despite these caveats, our model makes some steps toward a more realistic characterization of the political system of the United States than the traditional "winner takes all" model developed by Hotelling, Black, and Downs. Our modeling strategy was also stimulated by the observation that the political systems of other nations are even more remote from the standard two-party competitive model. First, in parliamentary democracies, relative shares of votes generally matter for policy outcomes. Second, various institutions which lead to some sort of "checks and balances" are common, even beyond presidential systems such as the United States, France, and Venezuela. For example, many federal systems leave significant policy-making powers in the hands of provincial, regional, or local government units. In such cases it would be possible to balance, at least partially, a, say, right-wing national government with left-wing administrations at lower levels. The basic logic of our model provides a stepping stone toward the analysis of institutional setups richer than the traditional two-party model. Alesina and Rosenthal (1993) . In Section A, we generalize the proof to the two-period model with P = 1 if MRZ = 2. In Section B, we treat the two-period model with incomplete information using specific functional forms.
As a preliminary, we discuss why mixed strategies need not be considered. It is immediate to show that (S, z) is dominated by some (T, y) E B for any z with measurable mixed legislative components on S. Similarly, assume there is (S, z) where S contains voters who, conditional on the legislative components, prefer R to D for president and are mixing on the presidential component. If they can increase the probability of election of their preferred party, the mixing is dominated by a (T, y) E B. A similar statement would apply to those who prefer D to R. Moreover, if (S, z) < (T, y) and (T, y) involves mixing, (S, z) < (T, y'), where y' uses pure strategies on T. Consequently, the only mixing that would be in X= W\?W would be nonpivotal mixing in presidential components. Such mixed strategies would not affect the policy outcomes associated with X. Therefore, allowing for mixed strategies would not alter our substantive conclusions.
A. The Two-Period Model with P, = 1 if MRZ =2
The proof requires two assumptions that restrict the institutional structure and preferences considered in the one-period model. 
B. The Incomplete Information Model
We maintain the definition of dominance used in the two-period model with complete information. We also maintain Bi. SCP is implied by quadratic utility.
We begin by generalizing the (CP) condition in the text to 0 <Pz < 1. Let oa(S) denote the measure of S conditional on the realization of a. (In other words, if Py < Pz and (I, z) < (T, y) with C conditions satisfied, individuals at the left-end of the policy space (i = -w, for example) must be better off. This and SCP establish that S must be a left coalition.) 2. The same can be shown for Scl, except that the vote and cutpoint expressions must be adjusted for the strategies of voters in I\S. The weak inequalities in (B-4) allow not only for P = 0 and P = 1 but also for the fact that S cI is not restricted to being a connected set.
